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ABSTRACT 
Myriad instances of animist phenomena abound in the Buddhist world, but due to the 
outdated concepts of thinkers such as Edward Tylor, James George Frazer, and Melford 
Spiro, commonly scholars perceive this animism merely as the work of local religions, 
not as deriving from Buddhism itself.  However, when one follows a number of 
contemporary scholars and employs a new, relational concept of animism that is based on 
respectful recognition of nonhuman personhoods, a different picture emerges.  The works 
of Western Buddhists such as Stephanie Kaza, Philip Kapleau Roshi, and Gary Snyder 
express powerful senses of relational animism that arise specifically from Buddhist 
thought and practice.  Recognizing the role of relational animism within Buddhism opens 
a new window on the dynamics of the tradition and this perspective can clarify issues 
such as the distribution of Buddhist (non)vegetarianism. 
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ANIMISM AMONG WESTERN BUDDHISTS 
Having quietly realized his enlightenment under a tree, the Buddha encountered 
the nonhuman natural world in a variety of ways, including meetings with animist spirits.  
Take, for example, a story from the Vinaya of the Pāli canon, the set of ancient texts that 
provides Theravāda Buddhism with its essential scriptures.  It seems that in the time of 
the Buddha, there were some monks at Ālavī who chopped down trees to build their 
housing, as it was common for the Buddha’s disciples to build simple forest huts.  The 
devatā, or resident spirit, of one of these trees implored a monk to stop the felling, yet the 
monk ignored the spirit and even struck the arm of the tree spirit’s son with an axe.  Now 
angered, the devatā considered killing the thoughtless monk, but instead sought counsel 
with the Buddha.  The Buddha listened to the tree spirit’s story with patience and 
compassion, finally recommending an unoccupied tree as a new home for the deity.  
Unfortunately, by this time both lay people and other monks were gossiping about the 
damage done to the forest by the hut builders.  In response, the Buddha scolded the 
‘foolish’ tree cutting monks for diminishing the prestige of the monastic sangha 
community and issued a new monastic rule, Pācittiya 11, which forbids unreasonable 
destruction of plants (Horner 2014, 656-657).  This illuminating story expresses animist 
relationships with nature that reside in the heart of the Pāli scriptures and alter the shape 
of Buddhism itself. 
Ajaan Sumano Bhikkhu, a contemporary Theravāda Buddhist monk from the 
United States, tells of another encounter with nature.  While meditating in a cave in 
Thailand, Sumano was so bothered by a hovering mosquito that he trapped it in a bottle.  
Over the next two days Sumano attempted to exert mind control over the mosquito, 
mentally influencing it to behave more like a butterfly.  Sumano then released the 
mosquito, who wasted no time in behaving like a mosquito and seeking Sumano’s blood.  
As he humorously describes it, this event taught Sumano that he lacks telepathic powers.  
But it also taught him that the mosquito had to be respected as an agent in its own right, 
possessing its own subjectivity, if Sumano’s patience and Dhamma practice were to 
advance.  Sumano concluded the story by teaching readers that such an extension of 
personhood is proper Buddhist behavior (Ajaan Sumano Bhikkhu 1999, 122).  In these 
two stories of the Buddha and the monk Sumano, decisively separated by space and time, 
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both men interact with beings from the natural world that are experienced as persons, or 
subjects who maintain their own senses of agency. 
Any visitor to a Buddhist country today almost certainly has encountered animist 
interactions with nature within Buddhist realities.  Although some attribute this animism 
simply to the influences of local religions, actually things are more complex, as 
everywhere in the Buddhist world one may find some local religiosity thoroughly 
admixed with, rather than simply coexisting with, Buddhist realities.  Geoffrey Samuel 
(1995) ably describes how indigenous traditions often work in tandem with Buddhist 
ones to create Tibetan religious worlds, and there are many other examples.  This 
prompts questioning about how Buddhism may participate from its own side in creating 
the numerous animist phenomena found not just in Buddhist Asia, but also in the 
Buddhist West.  As I will show, we need to explore animism in Buddhist universes more 
fully in order to understand the Buddhist tradition itself, since Buddhism actually retains 
some animist impulses of its own when animism is innovatively understood in terms of 
respectful relationships.   
Some outmoded concepts that still appear in Buddhist studies supply another 
reason to look again at animism in Buddhist realms.  The foundation of the concept of 
animism as understood by many scholars remains the work of Edward Tylor in his 
Primitive Culture of 1871.  In this text Tyler described animism in terms of beliefs, 
especially as found in indigenous religions, in the ‘souls of individual creatures, capable 
of continued existence after the death or destruction of the body’ (Tylor 1871, 383), so 
that animals and plants possess independent, human-like souls.  Not only did Tylor’s 
concept of animism colour the discipline of anthropology from its infancy, it also 
strongly affected the work of James George Frazer and his much-read The Golden Bough.  
Frazer (1922, 128) described animism as the belief that nonhuman natural beings, 
especially plants in his presentation, have souls like humans.  With these concepts of 
animism, Tylor and Frazer cast long shadows across a number of disciplines throughout 
the twentieth century.  However, the implication of Tylor and Frazer in colonialist 
agendas has led some recent scholars to eschew their works. 
Tylor and Frazer perhaps have had less historical influence in Buddhist studies 
than in some other disciplines because of the perception that their soul-based notions of 
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animism fuse poorly with Buddhist philosophical sensibilities regarding soul concepts.  
Buddhist philosophy notably rejects individual separateness in space or continuity in 
time, meaning that Buddhists generally dismiss the idea of a soul, as the Pāli Brahmajāla 
Sutta (Walshe 1995, 83) and many other scriptures indicate.  This rejection has led many 
scholars to argue that if animism is defined as possession of a soul, yet Buddhism denies 
the soul, then there can be no truly Buddhist animism.  Frazer (1922, 128, 129) himself 
proposed this argument, providing a form of received wisdom that animism exists in the 
Buddhist world through the effects of local traditions, not from Buddhism itself. 
Further, in his prominent study Burmese Supernaturalism, Melford Spiro (1967) 
offered another reason why Buddhism cannot host animism: the doctrine of karma. In 
many animist systems, animist spirits can impact human lives with boons of prosperity or 
blights of affliction.  But, for Spiro, Buddhism teaches that our fates are controlled by the 
force of karma and derive from an ethic of personal responsibility, not the whims of 
nature spirits.  Because of the disjuncture between animism and karma that Spiro 
perceived, he kept Buddhism and animism conceptually separate throughout his study, as 
many other Buddhologists have done. 
As influential as they have been, the perspectives of Tylor, Frazer, and Spiro have 
not kept pace with current scholarship, especially that which emerges from the study of 
religion and nature.  In recent decades scholars from a variety of fields have discarded the 
soul-based concept of animism and worked from scratch to produce a new, relational 
notion.  This dramatically renovated concept of animism not only ejects troublesome 
colonialist records, it also allows fresh insights into how Buddhism may host animism 
from its own side, thus providing scholars with a vital new window through which the 
dynamics of the Buddhist religion may be observed. 
 
A revised understanding of animism 
In his book Plants as Persons: A Philosophical Botany, Matthew Hall, a research 
botanist at the Royal Botanic Garden Edinburgh, argues strongly for the intellectual and 
moral recognition of plants as persons, because of their ‘sensitive, purposeful, [and] 
volitional behavior’ (Hall 2011, 12).  This idea of treating plants as persons will sound 
odd to some readers, given that in Western history, naturalists from Aristotle to Linnaeus 
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and religious voices from the Bible to Aquinas have encouraged relationships with plants 
that are ‘instrumental and hierarchical’ (9), resulting in an ontological dualism between 
humans and animals on one side and plants on the other.  Further, today some people 
think that plants cannot entertain inner experiences because they lack brains and central 
nervous systems.  But for mammals like humans, brains and central nervous systems 
remain inoperative on their own, as they merely serve as pathways for electrical 
discharges modulated by calcium, sodium, and potassium, these electrical discharges 
doing the real work of internal communication.  Likewise, plants, our distant 
evolutionary cousins, engage in internal communication through electrical discharges 
modulated by calcium, sodium, and potassium, just like humans, but of course their 
pathways for expressing their internal electrical communications differ (Chamovitz 2012, 
137-138).  Given this parallelism, one can appreciate that when a plant turns its leaves to 
the sun, a familiar plant process, that plant engages a state that, in a human, would be 
taken to indicate sensory awareness, some form of cognition, and intentional movement.   
Given facts such as these, Hall states that recent botanical research emphasizes 
the sometimes surprising abilities of plants, because ‘since the early nineteenth century, 
scientific evidence has steadily accrued which directly contradicts the hierarchy of 
nature….plants are increasingly being shown to demonstrate more sophisticated aspects 
of mentality such as reasoning and choice…plants and humans share a basic, ontological 
reality as perceptive, aware, autonomous, self-governed, and intelligent beings’ (Hall 
2011, 12).  Thus, for Hall, we need to relate to plants in ‘inclusive, nonhierarchical, 
dialogical ways’ that recognize ‘plants as subjects deserving of respect as other-than-
human persons’ (13), because ‘maintaining purely instrumental relationships with plants 
no longer fits the evidence that we have of plant attributes, characteristics, and life 
histories-and the interconnectedness of life on Earth’ (13-14). 
Hall’s work is just one example of a scholarly movement over the last fifteen 
years, embracing many otherwise disparate disciplines, which calls for the 
methodological recognition of nonhuman natural beings as subjects or persons in their 
own rights, rather than as mere backdrop for the human stage.  These new paradigms 
respect natural beings as sources of autonomy and agency, not just as instruments for 
human use.  For instance, it is common for many people to regard pets as people, as 
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members of a human family; thinkers in the natural personhood movement seek to extend 
this regard, without the anthropomorphism that can happen with pet keeping, more 
expansively across the nonhuman universe in heuristically potent ways.  In this scholarly 
movement, anthropomorphism must be rejected in favor of genuine cross-existent respect 
for the lifeworlds of natural beings as they arise phenomenologically.  These scholars 
wish to treat an elk as an elk person, not as a human person, through respect for the 
existential reality of an elk as an ecological subject. 
The Animal that Therefore I Am by the philosopher Jacques Derrida (2008) 
typifies works within this natural personhood movement.  In it Derrida describes an 
encounter in which his pet cat saw him naked, resulting in a feeling of shame for Derrida 
as he might feel before a human person.  This incident inspired reflection by Derrida 
regarding how Western philosophy generally has ignored such moments and avoided 
regarding animals as persons, leading to real world outcomes such as the horrors of 
factory farms (25-29).  Similar to Derrida, in ethology Barbara Smuts (2001, 294) writes 
effectively about how she failed to gain meaningful data from the baboon troop that she 
observed until she began regarding each member as a person, with agency and a lifeworld 
all its own, lending her study richness by perceiving the baboons as persons not entirely 
unlike human persons.  Natural personhood approaches exist in religious studies as well, 
such as with People Trees, David Haberman’s (2013) study of Hindu tree veneration.  
Haberman found that he most clearly understood the religious lives of his often modern 
and cosmopolitan informants when he appreciated that they regarded sacred trees as 
people in their own rights in healthy, rather than morbid or childish, ways.  Together 
Hall, Derrida, Smuts, and Haberman teach that respecting the subjectivity and 
personhood of nonhuman beings, when done correctly and without anthropomorphism, 
can be good science, not juvenile sentimentality. 
A subschool within the natural personhood movement informally is called ‘New 
Animism,’ as its constituent theorists turn to assorted world views to shape a novel 
concept of animism based on relationships between human and nonhuman persons.  New 
Animists reject Tylor’s idea that animism involves possession of a soul and instead 
define animism relationally.  Animism, for them, means living in a community of 
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persons, both human and nonhuman, and extending respect for the existential agency of 
those persons.   
Graham Harvey leads this effort in religious studies.  Harvey (2006, xi) says, 
‘Animists are people who recognize that the world is full of persons, only some of whom 
are human, and that life is always lived in relationship to others.’  He insists that what is 
needed is not anthropomorphic projection but rather a respect for both sameness and 
difference through recognition of relationship with an Other.  One may treat a human 
colleague respectfully as a person despite individual differences, and similarly one may 
extend respect to moss or lizards while appreciating dramatic divergences of respective 
lifeworlds.  However, Harvey (28) helpfully informs us that this animist extension of 
personhood is not Edenic, saying, ‘An “all-encompassing moral community” need not be 
a cozy, romantic vision of peace, co-operation, and unity.  Not only is enmity relational, 
but persons can be prey and/or predator.’ 
Harvey shares his concept of animism as a relationship between persons with 
another New Animist, the philosopher Freya Mathews.  Mathews argues that the received 
Cartesian world view supports a dualism that muddies our perceptions of reality and 
hence our scholarly understanding of it.  She suggests adopting instead a ‘pan-psychic’ 
perspective that overcomes the distorting effects of Cartesian dualism, calling for a ‘view 
of the universe as a conative unity, a self-realizing system that counts as a locus of 
subjectivity in its own right,’ so that ‘the interrogatory approach of science will be given 
up in favor of an altogether different approach: that of encounter’ (Mathews 2003, 9-10; 
her italics).   The anthropologist Nurit Bird-David, another New Animist, argues that a 
relational animist perspective can serve as an epistemology to overcome dualist 
separations of humans and the nonhuman natural world, as ‘against “I think, therefore I 
am” stand “I relate, therefore I am” and “I know as I relate.”’  When we reframe our 
knowledge this way, Bird-David says, we ‘learn what they [nonhumans] can do in 
relation to what we do, how they respond to our behavior, how they act towards us, what 
their situational and emergent behavior (rather than their constitutive matter) is’ (Bird-
David 1999, S78).  
By redefining animism as respectful personhood relationships rather than 
possession of a soul, New Animists provide a robust path for discussing animism in the 
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Buddhist world.  I will follow their methodological insights here, but only their 
methodological insights, as in this essay I do not suggest adoption of an animist ontology 
like Mathews does.  Therefore, in this study I define animism as a form of belief and 
practice in which nonhuman entities are experienced by humans relationally as persons in 
their own rights, with respect accorded to their specific subjective agencies through 
linguistic, ritual, or other interactions. 
Because the concept of a soul remains irrelevant to this relational notion of 
animism, this revised concept does not create the Buddhist discomfort engendered by 
Tylor’s soul-based notion.  In fact, animism understood relationally dovetails nicely with 
Buddhist portrayals of an interdependent universe.  This relational understanding also 
responds to Spiro’s rejection of Buddhist animism on karmic grounds, because Buddhism 
has long recognized the role of persons as emissaries through which the mechanisms of 
karma work.  You hurt me in a previous life, so in this life I hurt you; in this life I am 
your karmic emissary, the person who delivers your karmic due.  Likewise, with a 
relational understanding of animism that recognizes natural beings as karmic persons, 
prosperity or demise occur not through the random activities of nature spirits, as Spiro 
described, but rather through the actions of nonhuman animist persons as karmic 
emissaries.  With nonhuman persons as karmic actors, instead of subverting the karmic 
ethic of personal responsibility, relational animist persons help to supply the system 
through which karma shapes the world.  Indeed, a relational concept of animism 
highlights the Buddhist understanding that not just humans, but also nonhumans, 
sometimes participate in the workings of karma. 
A story within the Pāli canon evinces precisely this idea of animist persons as 
karmic emissaries.  At one time the Buddha stayed in the Jeta Grove when some 
merchants approached him and sought his blessing for their impending travel.  The 
merchants took refuge in the Buddha and vowed to embrace the Five Precepts before they 
set out.  Eventually they became lost in a pathless forest and, bewildered, ran out of 
supplies.  Then the merchants found a tree that glistened as if wet, causing the merchants 
to reason that the tree must be full of water.  They lopped off a branch and out streamed 
life-giving fluid.  Wondering what else the tree might contain, they cut off another large 
branch and delicious foods poured out of the resulting hole.  Removing a third branch 
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freed some delightful women and detaching a fourth resulted in the emergence of all 
manner of treasures.  The gleeful merchants then loaded up their carts and managed to 
return home.  Out of respect, they offered some of their boon to the Buddha, making sure 
to credit the spirit of the tree for their good fortune.  When they finished their story, the 
Buddha did not accord responsibility to the tree deity and instead stressed the men’s 
karma as the source of their prosperity: ‘This treasure you have received for your 
moderation and because you have not given yourselves to the power of desire’ (Cowell 
1902, 221).  Here an animist spirit offers a prosperity boon, precisely the behavior that 
Spiro claimed short-circuits karma, but the Buddha makes it clear that karma is working 
as expected and the tree spirit is merely the karmic emissary for the merchants.  In this 
story from the Pāli canon, there is no conflict between Buddhism and animism regarding 
karma when animism is understood relationally.     
It would seem that this relational concept of animism may be applied to any form 
of Buddhism, but in this essay I restrict myself to Western Buddhists.  Writers too 
numerous to mention have noted that Western Buddhists commonly stir Western 
environmentalist sensibilities into their spiritual practice, and communal groups have 
adapted to and aided such concerns.  As a result, environmentalism represents a salient 
thematic element of Western Buddhist thought and ritual that is so important that Richard 
Seager (1999, 215) described several forms of Western Buddhism as an ‘eco-centric 
sangha.’  These forms would seem ripe for producing distinctly Buddhist animisms and, 
in fact, Western Buddhism does not disappoint on this count.  If I had more space here, I 
could examine many voices, such as those of Bhikkhu Nyanasobhano, Thich Nhat Hanh, 
and Joanna Macy.  Instead, in this essay I will focus on the work of Stephanie Kaza, 
Philip Kapleau Roshi, and Gary Snyder, as these three Buddhists are well-respected and 
influential, and therefore are representative in some measure.  They each express vivid 
senses of relational animism in their works.  And although they each blend together many 
elements from the cosmopolitan Western Buddhist world and thus cannot be described as 
only Zen Buddhist in influence, they all call the Zen school their home.  This coincidence 
instructively deceives, for all three manifest relational animism in different ways despite 
sharing a common Zen pedigree, and in this paper’s conclusion these differences will be 
crucial regarding divergent Buddhist attitudes toward meat eating.  I turn first to the work 
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of Stephanie Kaza, as her book, The Attentive Heart: Conversations with Trees, may 
contain the single most vibrant sense of relational animism in the Western Buddhist 
world. 
 
Stephanie Kaza 
Kaza is a Professor of Environmental Studies at the University of Vermont who 
has distinguished herself as a scholar and an academic leader.  She also maintains a 
public identity as a Buddhist from the Sōtō Zen school, presenting herself in several 
works foremost as a Buddhist who happens to be an environmental scientist rather than 
the other way around, and it is on these works that I will direct my scrutiny.  A leader 
within the Buddhist Peace Fellowship and author or editor of books such as Mindfully 
Green: A Personal and Spiritual Guide to Whole Earth Thinking, Dharma Rain: Essays 
in Buddhist Environmentalism, and Hooked!: Buddhist Writings on Greed, Desire, and 
the Urge to Consume, Kaza combines her academic and spiritual trainings into a unique 
set of insights, especially regarding the importance of intimate experiences with trees. 
Kaza’s The Attentive Heart (1993) resembles the nature writings of John Muir 
through its jubilant flourishes regarding spiritual experiences in the natural world, 
genuine concern for nonhuman entities regarded as persons, and ecocentric perspectives.  
Like Muir, Kaza visibly decries excess human destruction of the natural world, this 
concern prompting her to choose the field of conservation biology.  Western economic 
philosophies, she tells us, are unsustainable, because with an expanding human 
population the planet simply cannot support their central goal of never-ending growth.  
She says that they also are alienating, as by design they lead citizens to treat natural 
beings merely instrumentally, only as objects for human use.  While Kaza recognizes that 
some human use of nonhuman nature is a matter of course, she feels that Western 
economic philosophies prevent humans from also experiencing natural beings in non-
instrumental ways, and the resulting one-sided approach to the nonhuman world can only 
result, she feels, in ever-greater human devastation of our own planetary home.  She 
shares that the social ethics of industrialized culture do not ‘include any thoughtful basis 
for mutually respectful relationships with trees’ (Kaza 1993, 4).     
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In response, Kaza teaches that we have a ‘moral obligation to forests and 
woodlands’ (Kaza 1993, 5), so one must claim a sense of natural beings as subjects, as 
entities with value in their own rights, if one is to act ways that are both ecologically 
sustainable as well as moral.  Echoing the ecologist Aldo Leopold, the path forward for 
Kaza involves renewing our senses of relationship with the land and its inhabitants.  Kaza 
writes, ‘The environmental movement is, as much as anything, a struggle to reclaim the 
land and relationship with the land for the common people’ (8).  For Kaza, doing so is 
important for the ethical challenge that the natural world provides to our Zeitgeist as ‘a 
place of truth, generating ethical power by its very existence,’ (8) as well as for enabling 
opposition to environmental degradation, since ‘acknowledgement of and participation in 
relationships with trees, coyotes, mountains, and rivers is central to the philosophy of 
deep ecology’ (10).   
Kaza’s own personal journey to renew her relationship with the land included a 
period of study at Starr King School for the Ministry.  For one of her projects, she chose 
specifically to go to the forest in order to explore and deepen her spiritual interactions 
with trees.  Her method for this personal experiment involved Zen shikantaza, or just 
sitting meditation.  She would sit with a tree and, in Zen fashion, try to drop all of her 
preconceptions, projections, and so on, so that she could commune directly with the bare 
tree as it was.  On this note it is important to emphasize that for Kaza, such practice 
should not be anthropomorphic.  She did not wish to experience trees as humanized, as 
one may find in a children’s movie, but to experience trees in themselves, with as much 
human subjectivity stripped away from the experience as possible.  She calls this method 
‘the attentive heart,’ where one seeks to interact openly, respectfully, and substantially 
with another being.  ‘The attentive heart’ is ‘the heart that feels the presence of others and 
the call to respond, the heart that lives in relationship with other beings’ (Kaza 1993, 
158).  This method occurs among humans; in her experiment Kaza included oaks, firs, 
and other tree persons as well. 
Kaza describes her journey to the forest as a pilgrimage (Kaza 1993, 32-33).  A 
grove of redwoods, for instance, provided her with a kind of temple to which she could 
make her sacred journey, and once there, she reveled in her sequoia sangha community, 
since in ‘offering homage to the trees, one cultivates ecological virtue’ (154).  Although 
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she self-consciously focused on trees, along the pathway to her various forest shrines, 
Kaza interacted with many beings other than trees as persons.  A glacier, sun, wind, 
snow, and ice were her friends at one point (237).  She says, ‘Each introduction to 
salamander and shrew is a step toward seeing the pattern of lives and movement that 
define the forest.  To say hello to trillium and redwood sorrel is to meet the friends of the 
tall trees’ (42).  Thus Kaza maintains an essentially ecocentric approach to nonhuman 
nature, so that ‘in an ecological sense, all beings are Buddhas with teachings to offer’ 
(Kaza 1991, 35). 
But in this experiment, she has come for conversations specifically with trees, 
conversations that, of course, are not formed with literal human speech.  The 
environmental scientist Kaza retains a sense of sobriety and wishes to avoid 
anthropomorphism and ordinary human sentimentalism in her interactions.  She admits 
that she does not understand ‘the language of these alders’ (Kaza 1993, 26), whom she 
describes as ‘water people’ (46).  But this does not mean to her that she cannot 
wordlessly sense some form of communication.  For Kaza, recognition of personhood, 
not verbal aptitude, is what is required.  To this end she uncannily describes her 
perception of a madrone tree in semi-erotic language commonly reserved for humans 
(74).  She hears, but not in an ordinary human way, the voice of redwoods calling her to 
friendship (39).  She insists on the necessity of knowing trees by species name, for the 
same reason why it would be rude to intimately interact with a human and not first be 
‘properly introduced’ (81).  Redwood trees, the ‘people of time’ (128) or the ‘yogis of the 
forest’ (131), can serve as meditation teachers by modeling a straight back (132).  And 
communication with a tree can occur, she found, through touch.  Repeatedly and for long 
periods, Kaza (28) placed her hands lovingly on trees, telling us, 
It is difficult to imagine the scale and complexity of activity that goes on 
inside a tree.  I sense in my hands some charge, some energetic force at 
work here.  Joining palms to trunk, I form a circle of energy with this tree.  
Listening through my hands, I meet this tree from my own experience of 
sunlight and stillness.   
She experiences these conversations not as a dominant human with a mindless object, but 
as a peer within ‘a co-created field of experience, generated as much by tree as by 
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person’ (Kaza 1993, 10).  As peer friends, ‘trees tell stories of fire, agriculture, and 
commercial cultivation’ (12).  However, communing deeply with a tree requires a time 
investment, because in the practice of ‘the attentive heart,’ ‘It takes time to see the deeply 
encoded patterns of destruction and transgression against trees and other nonhuman 
beings.  It takes time to cultivate a relational sensitivity that is compassionate and not 
pathological.  It takes time to embrace wholeheartedly the complexity of living with 
trees’ (Kaza 1993, 164). 
Kaza feels that the practice of ‘the attentive heart’ can lead to positive eco-
friendly actions, since it can motivate one better to appreciate both environmental 
problems and their solutions, and we see this in Kaza’s prose.  Sometimes like a Druid 
she soars in forest ecstasy, at one point joyfully greeting a variety of birds and plants 
before praising, ‘Such a lovely gathering of children and friends on a sweet, sunny 
afternoon’ (Kaza 1993, 43).  But, just as with human personhood relationships, 
friendships with trees that suffer and die can bring grief and sadness, as well as pleasure.  
When an elm tree encroached on the foundation of her mother’s house and thus was 
felled, Kaza created an informal funeral ritual for the tree, much mourning its ‘murder’ 
(96).  She also movingly shared her despair regarding an oak tree whom she had 
befriended.  Called away by urban human concerns, she had left it for some time.  Upon 
her return, she discovered that the tree had been chopped and killed.  In response, ‘the 
tree soul in me screamed with the shock of sudden loss’ (124).  She exclaimed, ‘My 
friend, taken apart by a chain saw.  AAaaayyy!!  the instrument of torture cut through my 
own limbs’ (124).  She felt complicit in the death of her oak friend, as she not only had 
left it helpless, but also she had cut herself off from ‘learning the wisdom of time in a 
wild context’ while occupied by her life among humans (124), and thus surrendered her 
empathic connection with her oak colleague.  In these ways Kaza modeled that ‘the 
attentive heart’ may make one more sensitive to environmental destruction but also, 
through positive experiences, more energetic in seeking what to Kaza is a more ethical 
relationship with nonhuman nature. 
These experiences prompt Kaza to appreciate, despite obvious differences in 
outward form, her essential sameness with trees.  For example, both trees and Kaza 
follow the same life rhythms of night and day through four seasons (Kaza 1993, 29).  
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Also, having intensely and lovingly practiced shikantaza and ‘the attentive heart’ at the 
base of a manzanita tree for some time, she said, ‘If I stayed here long enough, it seems 
like I would grow into a manzanita.  Put down roots and join back to back with you, Old 
One [manzanita tree].  That would be fine; some part of me is tree’ (67).  Through this 
feeling of sameness with trees, Kaza experiences trees as peers, as respected subjects in 
their own rights, as partners in existence rather than mere objects for human use.  This 
attitude, to Kaza, serves as an antidote to anthropocentric world views that result in 
environmental devastation.  Thus Kaza leaves us with vibrant personhood experiences 
with trees that arise from Buddhist thought and method and aid one in becoming more of 
an ‘eco-sattva’ (Kaza 2008, 13). 
 
 
Philip Kapleau Roshi 
Whereas Kaza offers a beautiful example of Buddhist relational animism with 
plants, Philip Kapleau Roshi, Zen master and founder of the Rochester Zen Center, 
provides a rich instance of relational animism with animals.  Born in New Haven, 
Connecticut, in 1912, Kapleau was so accomplished as a court reporter that he served as 
the chief Allied reporter at the first of the Nuremburg trials.  Afterwards being called to 
Japan for war trials there, Kapleau became interested in Japanese Zen Buddhist practice, 
and a return trip to Japan resulted in a thirteen year stay for Zen study.  In 1965 Hakuun 
Yasutani Roshi ordained him and gave him permission to teach within the Sanbōkyōdan 
lineage, which combines elements of Sōtō and Rinzai Zen.  In that same year Kapleau 
returned to the United States and published The Three Pillars of Zen, a classic in 
American Buddhist literature, and over the next few decades he produced several more 
books on the practice of Zen.  He died on May 6, 2004, from Parkinson’s disease 
complications (Buddhanet 2016). 
Kapleau’s influence continues to reverberate through the world of Western 
Buddhism in part because of his much-beloved book, To Cherish All Life: A Buddhist 
Case for Becoming Vegetarian (1986), in which Kapleau’s relational animism with 
animals, who possess ‘innate dignity and wholeness (holiness)’ (6), remains every bit as 
dynamic as Kaza’s tree animism.  For Kapleau, humans and animals share a ‘basic 
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kinship’ (6), given their interchangeable places within the wheel of reincarnation, as 
animals are reborn as humans and vice versa.  Beings in human incarnations remain 
‘karmically’ superior (6), but are not the ultimate creations (21), so that there is ‘no 
demarcation between humans and animals’ in terms of hierarchy (6).  Instead, reflecting 
an argument from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Suzuki 1973, 212), Kapleau teaches that 
humans and animals are peers, kin persons to each other (20), meaning that animals 
demand our respect for their subjectivities.  Human and animal worlds are interrelated 
networks of peers since the negative outcomes of environmental destruction are shared by 
animal and human alike (Kapleau 1986, 7).  Kapleau even encourages Buddhists to 
develop ‘interspecies communication’ with their animal kin, because humans have much 
to learn from them: ‘Animals, we know, are gifted with senses and psychic powers far 
keener than our own and they can teach us much about our own animal nature…provided 
we respect their uniqueness and do not patronize or exploit them’ (6-7).  Conversely, not 
treating animals with an ethic of respect and care for their subjectivities due to attitudes 
of human superiority inevitably leads to animals’ unethical treatment (23).   
For Kapleau, an example of a lack of kinship respect for animals is the human 
habit of eating meat, since he says that one cannot positively develop relationships with 
non-human persons while one is eating them (Kapleau 1986, 55).  Kapleau’s animal 
animism propels a rather unyielding advocacy for a vegetarian lifestyle for Buddhists, 
since for him eating animal persons violates the Buddhist precept of ahimsa, or non-
harm.  Meat eating, in fact, is a ‘war of aggression’ against animals (1).  Even if one does 
not kill the animal, eating meat by itself violates the non-harm precept because it makes 
one an accessory after the fact to both animal killing (19) and animal cruelty (9, 15), 
since Kapleau says that neither factory farms nor traditional pastoralism arise in cruelty-
free ways.  The relational personhood animism that motivates Kapleau’s argument 
appears most dramatically, perhaps, when he tells us that since animals are our kin, eating 
their bodies amounts to an act of cannibalism (20).   
But, fascinatingly, Kapleau’s relational animism also brightly shines in the 
negative.  Attempting to be culturally tolerant, Kapleau states that it is acceptable for 
members of some groups, such as the Eskimo, to eat meat, because they ritualize the hunt 
and respectfully regard their quarry as persons (54).  Thus, Kapleau’s essential argument 
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is that we should not eat animals because of their personhoods, but he adds the exception 
of Eskimos, who can eat animals precisely because they respect animals as persons.  
Either way, for the Zen master Kapleau, personhood attitudes toward nature determine 
ethical and spiritual dietary norms. 
But it is not just animals who suffer from meat eating, Kapleau tells us, since 
humans suffer as well.  Meat eating, the second human fall after Adam and Eve, leads to 
‘terror, violence, bloodshed, the slaughter of men [sic], and ultimately war’ (Kapleau 
1986, 1).  Kapleau teaches that attitudes of cruelty and bloodshed toward animals breed 
similar approaches to other humans, so that meat eaters play a part in a cycle that leads 
inexorably to violence against humans (16-17).  Moreover, eating meat means ingesting 
the ‘fear and terror’ (30) of the animals, these negative emotions becoming a part of one 
and preventing the development of a peaceful mind, providing the reason why Dōgen’s 
teacher in China instructed him that a vegetarian lifestyle was required for any serious 
advancement in meditation (35).  However, Kapleau warns against adopting a vegetarian 
lifestyle simply for one’s own benefit, as this becomes an attachment.  Instead, 
vegetarianism should be adopted for the sake of our animal kin (56). 
It is important to note that Kapleau’s vegetarianism-motivating relational animism 
includes animals, but only animals, as respected persons within the nonhuman realm.  
The plant beings on whom Kaza focused remain invisible in Kapleau’s text outside of 
their presences on our dinner plates.  Kapleau grants plants a ‘rudimentary’ 
consciousness (Kapleau 1986, 54), but implicitly denies them the ability to suffer.  In a 
book otherwise devoted to non-harm toward nonhumans, nowhere does Kapleau 
substantially apply the notion of non-harm to plants or consider their value apart from 
serving as human food.  Thus, for Kapleau, plants are not persons.  In his delimited 
biocentric view, one may not eat animals because animals are respected persons, but one 
may eat plants because plants are not.   
Of course, we found the botanist Matthew Hall earlier in this paper arguing 
precisely for a personhood recognition for plants, and Hall’s challenge to Kapleau 
indicates how varying relational animist perspectives can differ in texture and reach.  
Kaza’s intimate trees are not Kapleau’s friends, or at least not in the same way, so that 
when exploring relational animist perspectives, one must always pay attention to exactly 
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who is being experienced as a subject and why.  This insight informs conversation in this 
paper’s conclusion, where I return to the issue of Buddhist vegetarianism. 
 
Gary Snyder 
Born in 1930, writer and environmental activist Gary Snyder spent his childhood 
on a rural farm in Oregon.  Always a lover of the outdoors, in his youth Snyder 
mountaineered before working as both a logger and a forest ranger.  After graduating 
from Reed College, Snyder came to San Francisco in the early 1950s.  There he explored 
Chinese poetry, Chinese painting, and Japanese Zen as he gained language proficiency in 
ancient Chinese and modern Japanese at the University of California.  About this time he 
also began publishing his poetry as a member of both the San Francisco Renaissance and 
Beat Generation movements.  Then Snyder spent several years as a monk and English 
language teacher in the Japanese city of Kyoto, deepening his Rinzai Zen practice.  
Returning to the United States, he established a home in the Sierra Nevada foothills and 
his writing career spectacularly matured, with Snyder’s book Turtle Island winning the 
Pulitzer Prize for Poetry in 1975.  In part because of their powerful evocations of 
relationships with nature, Snyder’s prose and poetry remain prominent not just in 
Western Buddhist circles, but also within non-Buddhist American arts and 
environmentalist communities. 
It remains no surprise that Snyder, for all his life a naturalist, bemoans the 
environmental damage found throughout our world.  In sometimes scorching words 
Snyder attributes ecological woes to a variety of causes, including overpopulation 
(Snyder 1995, 33), the unequal distribution of wealth (60), a lack of intrinsic valuation of 
nature in Western cultures (209), and widespread anthropocentric attitudes of human 
superiority to the natural world, including within Buddhism.  Like Kaza, he also indicts 
contemporary capitalist economic philosophies, whose ultimate goal of eternal growth 
remains unsustainable on a planet that does not expand in carrying capacity (60).   
In response to these problems, Snyder suggests that Buddhists should develop 
eco-friendly attitudes in intentional, unique, and deeply personal ways, with the help of 
Buddhist meditation practices like zazen.  Calling this process ‘the practice of the wild,’  
by ‘practice’ Snyder means ‘a deliberate, sustained, and conscious effort to be more 
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finely tuned to ourselves and to the way the actual existing world is’ (Snyder 1990, x).  
This practice involves not just sitting meditation, but a whole-being, critical self-
evaluation to uncover genuinely nature-friendly, deceptively nature-friendly, and not 
nature-friendly attitudes within oneself.  One must overcome one’s attachments, 
aversions, and delusions with regard to one’s interactions with nature so that one may be 
open to the crucial experience, for Snyder, of profoundly experiencing elements of the 
natural world as respected persons with whom one relates. He asks us to ‘engage in more 
than environmentalist virtue, political keenness, or useful and necessary activism.  We 
must ground ourselves in the dark of our deepest selves…within the “natural nations” 
shaped by mountain ranges, river courses, flatlands, and wetlands’ (xi).  While the 
practice unfolds differently across individuals since there ‘is a “going” but no goer, no 
destination’ (162), for Snyder personally it includes conversing with trees and wood 
(114), perceiving a bear as a Buddha (Snyder 1995, 25-31), and having a cedar tree as an 
adviser (Snyder 1990, 127). 
In his employment of the word ‘wild’ in ‘practice of the wild,’ Snyder stands 
several common usages on their heads.  For him, the ‘wild’ is not a place or a thing, such 
as a remote forest where deer and snakes cavort.  The ‘wild’ instead is a process, a 
universal flux that runs through and informs all things as the reality of impermanence that 
the Buddha emphasized, ‘constantly going on without human intervention’ (Snyder 2014, 
84).  ‘“Wild” is a name for the way that phenomena continually actualize themselves’ as 
‘interconnected, interdependent, and incredibly complex’ (Snyder 1995, 168).  The ‘wild’ 
forms the reality through which we experience our true, undeluded selves in relationship 
with the many nonhuman beings, experienced as persons, who constitute the physical 
universe.  In this light Snyder says that New York City and Tokyo are both ‘natural’ but 
not ‘wild,’ since their human-oriented habitats inhibit realization of our relationships with 
nonhuman beings and thus lack wholeness, and ‘to speak of wilderness is to speak of 
wholeness’ (Snyder 1990, 12).  For Snyder, order can only be found in nonhuman realms, 
not these cities, as they are cultural centers and therefore remain disorganized, as all 
human cultural and political ventures are disorganized (100).  Snyder’s nonhuman 
universe is always orderly, and human social order arises from nature (19).   
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Snyder’s ‘wild’ also is the locus of the sacred, since while the ego self may arise 
within us as an artifact of culture, so the ‘wild’ arises as self-realization.  In this way, for 
Snyder, the classic Buddhist struggle with the ego self represents both the effort toward 
nirvana as well as, when done correctly, the healing of our relationships with the 
nonhuman world.  Snyder claims, ‘Self-realization, even enlightenment, is another aspect 
of our wildness-a bonding of the wild in ourselves to the (wild) process of the universe’ 
(Snyder 1990, xi).   
With his ecocentric notion of ‘the practice of the wild’ as a challenge, in his 
environmental activism Snyder encourages direct, aware, and respectful encounters with 
the nonhuman world understood as a community of subjects rather than a group of 
objects.  In this effort Snyder stresses the need for a deep, bioregional sense of place, as 
he writes, ‘The wild requires that we learn the terrain, nod to all the plants and animals 
and birds, ford the streams and cross the ridges’ (Snyder 1990, 26).  He criticizes 
Westerners for always being on the move and distracted from the nonhuman world, never 
enjoy a rich sense of where they are in terms of the animals, insects, plants, rocks, and 
bodies of water that provide their immediate surroundings.  Without a clear sense of 
place in this way, including awareness of the nonhuman persons there, for Snyder 
humans remain alienated not just from the nonhuman world but also from the sacred 
‘wild’ elements within themselves, since they live within a sacramental mandala yet fail 
to realize their proper positions and interactions within its overall design.  One must 
reverse this process and recover a grounded sense of place, says Snyder, if one is to 
become more eco-friendly in outlook.  Snyder teaches that realizing one’s 
interconnections in wise and compassionate ways begins in one’s back yard and cannot 
continue without this local support, since only with this sense of place are we truly 
ourselves.     
Developing this awareness of place makes us truly in touch with natural rhythms 
through extended periods of time, so that we can see more clearly what truly may be 
amiss and what may be an organic process of healing with which we should not interfere.  
One does not need to embrace nature as sacred, just be willing to listen to nature (Snyder 
1990, 103), because ‘mind is fluid, nature is porous, and both biologically and culturally 
we are always fully part of the whole’ (Snyder 1995, 81).  But for this listening, one must 
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be fully present in the moment, or mindful in a Buddhist sense, with natural beings as 
relational animist persons, since, ‘To see a wren in a bush, call it “wren,” and go on 
walking is to have (self-importantly) seen nothing.  To see a bird and stop, watch, feel, 
forget yourself for a moment, be in the bushy shadows, maybe then feel “wren”-that is to 
have joined in a larger moment with the world’ (179).  In this way, ‘the practice of the 
wild’ manifests differently across individuals not just because of divergent personal 
worldviews, but also because the place-focused practice is performed in varying 
locations.  But Snyder says that ‘the practice of the wild’ need not be done exclusively in 
bucolic settings, as it should stay with one even in urban surroundings, since ‘Great 
Brown Bear is walking with us, Salmon is swimming upstream with us, as we stroll a city 
street’ (Snyder 1990, 101).  In this way, for Snyder, maybe ‘the spirits of douglas fir, 
redwood, cedar, liveoak, manzanita, and especially salmon will guide us past gridlock 
and smog to a new culture’ (Snyder 2007, 96), Snyder here evidencing clear relational 
animism. 
Interestingly, Snyder’s environmentalism does not lead to a Buddhist plea for 
vegetarianism, as it does for so many other Buddhists.  With his ecocentric focus on 
human and nonhuman nature as a process in which a variety of respected persons are 
involved, he sees no reason for ethically valuing animal persons above plant persons, as 
instead he values ‘the total ecological health of the region’ (Snyder 1995, 34).  He says, 
‘Every boulder on a talus slope is different, no two needles on a fir tree are identical.  
How could one part be more central, more important, than any other?’ (Snyder 1990, 
164).  For him, ‘the very distinction “vegetarian/nonvegetarian” is too simple’ (Snyder 
1995, 67) because ‘the First Precept goes beyond a concern just for organic life’ (70).  As 
a result, unselfconscious incidents of meat eating pepper his poetry.  While he does not 
oppose vegetarianism and very much opposes the current factory farm system, for him 
the important factor remains respectful recognition of the personhood of the nonhuman 
Other.  He feels that everything one eats is a natural person, and as long as one collects 
and eats food with respect, the question of the existential category of that animal, plant, 
or mineral person is not overly relevant (Snyder 1990, 22).  In fact, Snyder invites us to 
enter the ‘wild’ reality that we are both eater and eaten within a much larger universe, 
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and in fact the constant dining within the human and nonhuman natural world reveals its 
character as a holy, sacramental reality (20). 
 
Culinary conclusion 
Kaza, Kapleau, and Snyder each exhibit senses of relational animism that emerge 
from the wombs of their own Buddhist outlooks and practices.  Kaza, for instance, uses 
Zen meditation and Buddhist compassion to reach out to trees, who reward her with 
valuable spiritual lessons.  Kapleau does not want Buddhists to be vegetarian for their 
own benefit, but for the benefit of animals who, as kin persons, are respected and cared 
for in a way that is based upon Buddhist principles.  Snyder asserts that green Buddhist 
practice develops and develops from personhood encounters, enriched with Buddhist 
mindfulness, with as many ants, birds, pines, and pebbles in one’s location as possible.  
Of course, these eclectic writers create their perspectives amidst diverse influences.  
Nonetheless, in their expressions one may detect relationships of sincere respect for at 
least some nonhuman beings as persons, fitting the relational definition of animism, and 
these relationships emerge at least in part from Buddhist thought and practice.  Therefore, 
for Kaza, Kapleau, and Snyder, relational animism arises somewhat as a Buddhist 
phenomenon, not just from admixtures from local religiosity, and with them we may 
speak of specifically Buddhist animism. 
These examples show that a relational concept of animism permits the opening of 
an expansive new window on Buddhist dynamics, since relationships with nature shape 
and are shaped by human religiosity (Capper 2016, 13).  Take, for just one example, the 
issue of vegetarianism mentioned previously.  Understanding the distribution of Buddhist 
meat and non-meat dietary practices remains complex.  Theravādin and Tibetan 
Buddhists historically have accepted the eating of meat, although sometimes they choose 
to abstain from meat for reasons of Buddhist piety.  Conversely, Buddhists such as 
Kapleau who follow lineages that stem from Chinese Mahāyāna schools that emphasize 
the Śūraṅgama, Nirvāṇa, Brahmajāla, and Laṅkāvatāra Sūtras tend to be vegetarians, 
although meat eating among them is hardly unknown.  I suggest that if we understand 
Buddhist vegetarianism using a relational animist tool, we gain some traction in 
comprehending this multifaceted situation.  For example, Kapleau insists, on the grounds 
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of respect for animal personhood, that Buddhists not eat animals.  Yet he does not extend 
his animism to plants or other natural entities, instead explicitly encouraging their 
instrumental usage.  Snyder, with a more ecocentric vision, sees things differently.  He 
wants to eat in concert with the total health of his natural surroundings rather than 
discriminating against plant persons in favor of animal persons.  Because plants are 
animist people for Snyder, unlike Kapleau, his ethical calculus yields a different result, 
one that includes meat eating.  Kaza, for her part, leaves the issue of diet open.  She 
offers several reasons to practice vegetarianism, including pollution caused by meat 
farming, the cruelty of factory farms, human health challenges, and spiritual well-being 
(Kaza 2008, 6-8).  But because she feels that the experience of the ‘the attentive heart’ is 
unique to each individual, Kaza says that the issue of Buddhist diet involves questions 
that Buddhists must confront in their own ways, from the basis of their own personhood 
relationships with nonhumans, while they remain as mindful as possible of their 
consumption patterns as part of a knotty ‘koan of consumerism’ (Kaza 2005, 139).  Thus, 
Kapleau, Snyder, and Kaza each offer a different approach to the question of Buddhist 
diet based on varying perceptions of personhood relationships with the natural world, 
spotlighting one important role played by emergent Buddhist animism. 
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